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Abstract: In this paper, I will re-examine the refutation of reductive 
naturalism by the anti-reductionist and the phenomenologist. I want 
first to outline a possible way of consistently polarising the field by 
showing that the anti-reductionist and phenomenologist adhere, at least 
to some degree, to what I will call the ‘principle of appearing qua 
appearing.’ The exemplar of reductive naturalism that I will go on to 
use is the work of Thomas Metzinger, which has come under serious 
criticism from phenomenologists. While this criticism has often 
assumed that Metzinger conflates phenomenology with introspection, I 
think that this is simply a terminological issue that will be sidestepped in 
order to look at the deeper problems that Metzinger’s work poses to 
the refutation of reductive naturalism. I go on to argue that this 
refutation relies upon the transcendentalism of appearances, and can be 
considered to be question begging. I will then consider three possible 
responses to my argument. 
 
Key words: Metzinger, reductive naturalism, transcendentalism, 
phenomenolgy 
 
The Principle of Appearing Qua Appearing 
 
ith regard to consciousness, I would like to polarise the field by 
promoting a unifying principle for those anti-reductive philosophers 
who assume both that consciousness exists, and, as Ned Block puts 
it; that “[o]ur fundamental access to consciousness derives from our 
acquaintance with it.”1 David Chalmers, for example states: “I have assumed 
that consciousness exists […] although I can no more ‘prove’ it than I can 
prove that I am conscious.”2 Whilst phenomenology is most concerned with 
how things appear to us, I will also suppose that this is an unproblematic 
                                                 
1 Ned Block, “Begging the Question against Phenomenal Consciousness,” in Behaviour 
and Brain Sciences, 15:2 (1992), 205. 
2 David Chalmers, “Reply to Mulhauser's Review of ‘The Conscious Mind,’” in Psyche, 
2:35 (November 1996). 
W
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account of Husserlian phenomenology: for example, Husserl states that “[T]he 
objects of which we are ‘conscious,’ are not simply in consciousness as in a box 
[…] they are first constituted as being, what they are for us, and as what they 
count as for us.”3 Such philosophers have intuition on their side, claiming that 
the burden of explanation would most definitely rest with philosophers such as 
Daniel Dennett and Metzinger to establish a significant and substantial 
argument to the contrary.4 Chalmers lucidly delineates the ramifications of this 
position: Subjective experience is where our attempt to understand the world 
begins, and as such, is given to us as a brute fact, whose existence is not open to 
question: “If it were not for the fact that first-person experience was a brute 
fact presented to us, there would seem to be no reason to predict its 
existence.”5  
Now, I want to assert that there is a second and sometimes implicit 
premise that the anti-reductionist and phenomenologist share: Conscious 
experience should be understood to be the domain of appearances as such. John 
Searle articulates this point: “Consciousness consists in the appearances 
themselves. Where appearance is concerned we cannot make the appearance-
reality distinction because the appearance is the reality.”6 I want to call this the 
‘principle of appearing qua appearing,’ or AqA.7 Even if we accept Block’s 
distinction of access consciousness (AC) and phenomenal consciousness (PC), 
(or Chalmers’ similar distinction between psychological and phenomenal 
consciousness), the principle of AqA holds for phenomenal consciousness, 
since, for Block; “P-consciousness, as such, is not consciousness of.”8 
Following the above two premises, we can suggest that two 
conclusions follow, one positive and one negative. First, consciousness should 
                                                 
3 Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations I (London: Routledge, 2001), 275. 
4 David Chalmers, “Moving Forward on the Problem of Consciousness,” in The Journal 
of Consciousness Studies, 4:1 (1997), 9. 
5 David Chalmers, “Consciousness and Cognition,” (1990) http://consc.net/ 
papers/c-and-c.html. 
6 John Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1992), 121. 
Dennett’s verificationist account has been touted as also refusing the appearance / reality 
distinction (e.g. Glenn Carruthers & Elizabeth Schier, “Our Intuitions about Consciousness are 
Inconsistent,” Paper presented at the Australasian Association for Philosophy Conference, 
Melbourne, Australia. July 2008). However, it may be that such a view equivocates on the notion 
of consciousness in Dennett’s early work, since he quite clearly states: “There seems to be 
phenomenology […] But it does not follow from this undeniable, universally attested fact that there 
really is phenomenology.”  Daniel Dennett, Consciousness Explained, (Boston: Little Brown, 1991), 
336.  Dennett refuses the transcendentalism of appearances, but his refusal of an appearance / 
reality distinction for subjective access seems most likely to be a result of his intent to disavow the 
Cartesian theatre in this manner. 
7 The term ‘appearing qua appearing’ has been used previously by phenomenologists 
such as Jan Patocka, An Introduction to Husserl’s Phenomenology, trans. by Erazim Kohak (Chicago, 
IL: Open Court, 1996). 
8 Ned Block, “On a Confusion about a Concept of Consciousness,” in Behaviour and 
Brain Sciences, 18: 2 (1995). However, Güzeldere and Aydede provide a fairly convincing 
argument against the legitimacy of Block’s distinction of AC and PC. Cf. Guven Güzeldere and 
Murat Aydede, “On the Relation Between Phenomenal and Representational Properties,” in 
Behavioural and Brain Sciences, 20:1 (1997). 
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be ostensively defined, and taken to be an “irreducible aspect of reality,”9 as 
Thomas Nagel put it, an explanandum that blocks the integration of the first-
person point of view into the third-person scientific viewpoint. This claim need 
not be metaphysical, it need simply to assert as Levine does: “[T]hat conscious 
experiences themselves, not merely our verbal judgments about them, are the 
primary data to which a theory must answer.”10 
Second, that reductionism with regard to consciousness is self-
refuting, since it ignores that which it would presume to explain. Depending 
upon philosophical allegiance, this refutation takes different forms. For 
example, Searle argues that: scientific reduction attempts to reveal the reality 
behind appearances, however, in the case of consciousness, reality and 
appearance are inseparable – appearance is the reality – and thus, there can be 
no reduction. Let us also quickly follow Chalmers who argues that:  
 
If someone says ‘I can see that you have explained how 
DNA stores and transmits hereditary information […] 
but you have not explained how it is a gene,’ then they are 
making a conceptual mistake. All it means to be a gene is 
to be an entity that performs the relevant storage and 
transmission function. When someone says ‘I can see that 
you have explained how information is discriminated, 
integrated, and reported, but you have not explained how 
it is experienced,’ they are not making a conceptual 
mistake. This is a nontrivial further question.11 
 
To reiterate the premises and conclusions of the above anti-
reductionist argument: 
 
1. Consciousness exists, and is given to the first-person in experience 
as a brute fact.  
2. There can be no appearance / reality distinction as far as 
consciousness is concerned (AqA). 
                                                 
9 Thomas Nagel, “Conceiving the Impossible and the Mind-Body Problem,” in 
Philosophy, 73: 285 (1998), 338. 
10 Joseph Levine, “Out of the closet: A qualophile confronts qualophobia,” in 
Philosophical Topics, 22 (1994), 107–26. Levine assumes both that the distinction between the 
experiences themselves and our reports upon them is assured, and that we have a common-sense 
intuition regarding what this ‘primary data’ is supposed to be.  
11 David Chalmers, “Facing up to the Problem of Consciousness,” in The Journal of 
Consciousness Studies, 2:3 (1995), 203. Cf. Galen Strawson: “[F]or there to seem to be rich 
phenomenology or experience just is for there to be such phenomenology or experience.” Galen 
Strawson, “Realistic Monism,” in Alan Freeman ed., Consciousness and it’s Place in Nature: Does 
Physicalism Entail Panpsychism? (Exeter: Imprint, 2006), 6n7. 
 
 
 
J. TRAFFORD     169 
C1. Consciousness is an irreducible aspect of the world that resists 
objective description.12  
C2. Reductive naturalism is self-refuting.  
 
All of the above claims are central to phenomenological philosophy, 
and appear, for example, in Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl’s critique of Metzinger. 
However, it is clear that these assertions are transcendental as far as 
phenomenologists are concerned. Consider Jan Patocka’s statement: “I cannot 
go back to what appears to explain the appearing of appearing, since the 
understanding of appearing is presupposed in every thesis I might make about 
the appearing entity.”13 There is a transcendental assertion that precludes us 
from explaining the appearing of appearing, since this would induce a vicious 
circularity in our argumentation – it would necessitate us ‘forgetting’ the very 
conditions upon which we are able to make statements.14 By treating 
consciousness as one object amongst others, we would be engaging in a 
performative contradiction, since it is the very dimension of consciousness that 
gives us access to the world in the first place.15  
This argument hinges on the principle of AqA – that appearances 
should be accounted for on their own terms. Consider Husserl’s ‘principle of 
principles’:  
 
[T]hat every originary presentive intuition is a legitimizing 
source of cognition, that everything originally […] offered 
to us in intuition is to be accepted simply as what it is 
presented as being, but also only within the limits in 
which it is presented there.16 
                                                 
12 Cf. Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl’s critique of Metzinger on this point, “The Limits of 
Representationalism,” in The Journal of Consciousness Studies, 11:10-11 (October-November, 2004), 
369. 
13 Jan Patocka, Plato and Europe, trans. by Petr Lom (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2002), 24. 
14 Cf. Husserl: “If certain riddles are, generally speaking, inherent in principle to 
natural science, then it is self-evident that the solution of these riddles according to premises and 
conclusions in principle transcends natural science. To expect from natural science itself the 
solution of any one of the problems inherent in it as such […] or even merely to suppose that it 
could contribute to the solution of such a problem any premise whatsoever, is to be involved in 
a vicious circle.” Edmund Husserl, “Philosophy as a Rigorous Science,” in P. McCormick and F. 
Elliston eds., Husserl: Shorter Works (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1911/1981), 
172. 
15 It is worth noting that the structure of this argument is similar to that made against 
eliminative materialism as ‘self-defeating.’ Cf. Lynne Rudder-Baker, Saving Belief: A Critique of 
Physicalism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987) and Paul Churchland, “Eliminative 
Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes,” in The Journal of Philosophy, 78:2, (1981), 76-90 for a 
fairly convincing response. 
16 Edmund Husserl, Ideas pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological 
Philosophy, First Book, trans. by F. Kersten (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1982), 44. 
This is also the case for weaker claims such as: “Introspective conception affords one a 
transparent understanding of the nature of one’s mode of consciousness.” Philip Goff, 
“Appearance, Reality, and the Reality of Appearance,” Paper given at Brains Persons and Society, 
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Philip Goff makes a similar (though weaker) argument:  
 
When you attend, say, to your feeling of toothache, you 
are conceiving of that feature of reality […] in terms of 
what it is like to have it. But the nature of the feeling of 
toothache is exhausted by what it's like to have it.17  
 
From AqA, consciousness just is the way things appear to us – the 
first-person phenomenological subject – so there is an epistemic asymmetry 
that is ineliminable for reductive naturalism.18 It is my claim that by holding the 
principle of AqA, the anti-reductionist is as much of a transcendentalist as the 
phenomenologist. Why? Because the principle is a transcendental assertion 
precluding further explanation: experience is an explanandum, not an explanans, 
or as Chalmers puts it: “Conscious Experience […] forces itself upon us as an 
explanandum and cannot be eliminated so easily.”19 The refutation of reductive 
naturalism rests upon the transcendentalism of conscious appearances, so that 
reductionism regarding those appearances is rejected not just as empirically 
false, but as necessarily false, and incoherent. To substantiate this claim, let us 
turn to Metzinger’s form of reductive naturalism. 
 
Metzinger’s Achievement 
 
Metzinger’s work can be taken as a response to such transcendentalism 
in three ways: a) he provides a sub-personal naturalistic account of 
consciousness; b) he provides an account of our ‘seeming’ to be genuine 
subjects of experience; c) he argues that, in spite of this ‘seeming,’ there are no 
subjects of experience in the world.20 If we are to refuse the principle of AqA, 
the second is most important: it explains why we experience ourselves in terms 
of first person subjectivity as an explanandum. It is incumbent upon reductive 
                                                                                                                  
Milan (2006). Similarly, I would suggest that claims such as ‘experiences are immediately familiar 
to the subject of experience,’ and ‘we have a privileged way of knowing our own thoughts, 
feelings, and sensations,’ would fall under the same category.  
17 Ibid. 
18 Cf. Chalmers: “[O]ur grounds for belief in consciousness derive solely from our 
own experience of it.” David Chalmers, The Conscious Mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996), 
101. 
19 Ibid., 109. As Teed Rockwell remarks, Chalmers’ ‘Hard Problem’ is in fact impossible 
to answer in the form in which it is formulated, since Chalmers argues that we cannot explain 
consciousness in terms of structure and function, yet this is precisely what an explanation 
consists of. Thus, for example, Chalmers defines function as: “Any causal role in the production 
of behavior that a system might perform.” David Chalmers, “Facing up to the Problem of 
Consciousness,” 202. If this is the case, then, as Rockwell notes, surely the ‘hard problem’ is not 
a problem at all since it in principle cannot be solved. Teed Rockwell, “The Hard Problem is 
Dead, Long Live the Hard Problem,” <http://www.cognitivequestions.org/hardproblem.html>, 
(1999). 
20 This list is lifted almost wholesale from Lynne Rudder Baker’s summary of 
Metzinger’s work, Lynne Rudder-Baker, Saving Belief: A Critique of Physicalism.  
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naturalism to present a theory of why consciousness and first person 
experience seem to be a ‘brute fact.’ In order to achieve this, Metzinger has to 
account for appearances as such by making the distinction between explanandum 
and explanans untenable.  
Primarily, Metzinger argues that phenomenal experience should be 
understood in terms of a process of mental presentation; a physically realised 
process that relates a system, and internal state of that system, and a partition 
of the world. This process generates a phenomenal representatum, or a presentatum 
(the vehicle of presentation), the content of which signals a presentandum for the 
system. Refusing to separate vehicle and content in this way, Metzinger uses 
this process to outline his understanding of phenomenal self-representation as 
the process by which the system as a whole generates the content of a self-
representational state. In this way, the system as a whole activates a self-model: 
a self-representatum that is a time-slice of the ongoing, physically realized process 
of representation.  
In order for this self-model or system-model to become a phenomenal 
self – to move from representational self-modelling to the consciously 
experienced phenomenal property of selfhood – there is a transparency 
constraint. Metzinger understands certain properties of experience to be 
phenomenologically transparent. In contrast to the conception of phenomenal 
transparency proposed by G.E. Moore, and more recently, Sydney Shoemaker 
and Michael Tye, Metzinger defines transparency as follows: “For every 
phenomenal state, the degree of phenomenal transparency is inversely 
proportional to the introspective degree of attentional availability of earlier 
processing stages.”21 Transparency is the property of mental representations 
that gives rise to a phenomenal model of reality. It is this ‘reality-model’ that is 
experienced firsthand as pre-reflectively and immediately given to the self in 
the experience of presence within a world. Nevertheless, transparency results 
from an architectonic feature of the information processing that allows for the 
transparent activation of this mental model, since, for example, the earlier 
processing stages that unify conscious content are systematically deleted from 
the experience of the unified global model of the world. A phenomenal 
representatum or, as Metzinger puts it, a presentatum is one that cannot be 
recognized as such by the system activating it: consequently, we experience 
ourselves as living in the world right now.  
In this respect, the relation between the presentatum and presentandum is 
essentially asymmetric since the earlier processing stages of representation are 
systematically occluded from the presentational content: phenomenal 
experience is a presentatum that emerges precisely as a result of the occlusion of 
the presentandum (the vehicle of presentation). The phenomenal experience of 
the self is also a form of mental content that is brought about specifically 
because of the deletion of earlier representational processes. So, what 
Metzinger calls the ‘Phenomenal Self-Model’ (PSM), is brought about by a 
                                                 
21 Thomas Metzinger, “Phenomenal Transparency and Cognitive Self-Reference,” in 
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences II (2003), 353-393. 
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‘special form of epistemic darkness’: “Phenomenal transparency in general […] 
means that something particular is not accessible to subjective experience, 
namely, the representational character of the contents of conscious 
experience.”22 This is the case, not only for sensory modalities and our 
integrated phenomenal model of the world, but also for much of our PSM, 
leaving us necessarily in a state of naïve realism with regard to appearings, 
including the appearing of the self.23 Accordingly, the seeming of Chalmers’ 
‘brute fact’ becomes intelligible, since any conscious system with a 
phenomenally transparent self-model would, by necessity, be a naïve realist 
about itself. It makes sense to ask what an experience is like beyond the way it 
appears since the mode of presentation is phenomenally independent of how it 
appears to the phenomenal subject. That is to say, Metzinger’s thesis is not a 
kind of self-deception – the self is a particular form of phenomenal content 
that is not epistemologically justified since it does not correspond to any single 
entity inside or outside of the self-representing system.24 As Metzinger puts it: 
“The phenomenal property of selfhood is constituted by transparent, 
nonepistemic self-representation.”25 
In order to show that Metzinger is not tilting at straw men by 
assuming that the self is substantive or non-physical, he then needs to show 
how category errors that have been concretised through linguistic ascription 
can be revised.26 This is precisely the role of the PSM as Metzinger has 
formulated it. If a system integrates its own operations, using mental 
simulations of propositional structures that could be true or false, into its 
existing transparent self-model, while attributing the causal role of generating 
these representational states to itself, the system as a whole will consciously 
experience itself as the thinker and subject of its own thought, and, it will make 
this phenomenal content available for cognitive processing.27 That is, 
Metzinger does not simply refuse the ineliminability of de-se-attitudes, he 
characteristically introduces a third-term asymmetry in order to explain the 
existence of I*-thoughts and I*-sentences.28 The resulting explanation consists 
of showing how ‘brute facts’ regarding appearances as such, and I*-thoughts, 
can be accounted for by showing that they rely upon representational content 
that is in principle unavailable because, on the level of phenomenal experience, 
the first-person perspective is transparent, and, as such, is epistemically 
unjustified content. 
                                                 
22 Thomas Metzinger, Being No-One (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003), 169. 
23 That is, where presentational states are subpersonal and subdoxastic, cf. Stephen 
Stich, “Beliefs and Subdoxastic States,” in Philosophy of Science, 45 (December, 1978), 499-518. 
24 Metzinger, Being No-One, 565. 
25 Ibid., 337. 
26 Cf. Patricia Churchland, “Can Neurobiology Teach Us Anything about 
Consciousness?,” in Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 67:4, (January, 
1994) 23-40. 
27 Metzinger, “Phenomenal Transparency and Cognitive Self-Reference,” 369. 
28 On I* sentences and I* thoughts, cf. H. N. Castañeda, “>He<: A study on the logic 
of self-consciousness,” in Ratio, 8 (1966), 130-157. 
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Accordingly, using the resources that Metzinger has provided us with, 
we are able to account for the representation of the first-person perspective, 
since cognitive self-reference refers to the phenomenal content of a transparent 
self-model. That is, the conscious cognitive subject lacks epistemic justification 
for the corresponding belief states about that is actually being represented at 
the level of phenomenal content.29 Since I would argue that Metzinger is a 
reductive naturalist, rather than an eliminativist, I take him to have shown, 
following Patricia Churchland, that “The available theory specifies not only 
what counts as an explanation, but also the explananda themselves.”30 As a 
result, both the explanandum and explanans are open to revision, including a 
revision of experience itself.  
 
The Reality of Appearances 
 
I want to argue that Metzinger’s account should be taken as a response 
to the attempt to refute reductive naturalism on the grounds of the principle of 
AqA31 I am not arguing that reductive naturalism is correct, only that it can be 
defended against such arguments. Now, the phenomenologist and anti-
reductivist may still argue that Metzinger engages in a performative 
contradiction, since it is consciousness that is supposed to be the condition of 
possibility for all knowledge. This is the argument of self-refutation, which, 
simplistically would look something like this: 
The reductive naturalist: 
 
i. Denies the existence of genuine subjects of experience. 
ii. However, he himself is a genuine subject of experience. 
iii. His statement that there are no genuine subjects of experience 
relies on him being a genuine subject of experience. 
iv. Therefore, he is guilty of a performative contradiction by 
relying on that which he attempts to deny. 
 
This is undoubtedly a simplification: nonetheless, it is precisely the 
second step of this argument that the principle of AqA is supposed to uphold. 
It is by adhering to this principle that the argument explicitly assumes 
something for which Metzinger provides an alternative explanation. By 
showing how the principle of appearing qua appearing is central to the 
refutation of reductive naturalism, I hope also to have shown how and why 
this is a transcendental argument. The refutation is question begging since it 
                                                 
29 Metzinger, Being No-One, 404. 
30 Patricia Churchland, “The Hornswoggle Problem,” in The Journal of Consciousness 
Studies, 3:5-6, (1996), 398. 
31 Though Chalmer’s ‘call to arms’ is directed towards Dennett, it clearly applies to 
Metzinger: “Dennett […] has often stated how radical and counterintuitive his position is. So it is 
clear that the default assumption is that there is a further problem of explanation; to establish 
otherwise requires significant and substantial argument.” Chalmers, “Moving Forward on the 
Problem of Consciousness,” 9. 
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assumes AqA to be true, while it is precisely AqA that reductive naturalism 
would both dispute and revise. What’s more, by providing an explanation for 
the ‘seeming’ of this ‘genuine’ subject of experience, we can contend that the 
argument against reductive naturalism relies upon a naturalistic fallacy, viz., that 
the reality of consciousness is given in experience. Thus, we can also show that 
the argument that reductive naturalism is self-refuting is question begging, 
since it rests upon an explanatory principle, which has been illegitimately 
construed as transcendental. 
Let us briefly consider another example of the refutation argument, 
this time found in Chalmers and Goff: 
 
i. There is something that ‘it is like’ to be a subject of 
experience.32 
ii. We have direct knowledge of subjective experiences from 
first-person access. 
iii. Subjective experiences are the central data that we want from 
a science of consciousness. 
iv. No third person data will express this data. 
   C.       First-person data are irreducible to third person data.  
 
In this form, the principle of appearing qua appearing is outlined in the 
second and third premises. Note that while it does not presuppose 
incorrigibility as such, the first person is assumed to enjoy intimacy with its own 
conscious states, so that there could be no more reality to conscious 
experiences than we are able to discover through our phenomenal experience 
of them.33 This is just another way of saying that: “In the special case of 
conscious experience, appearance and reality cannot come apart […] How things 
appear to us just is the reality we are attending to when we attend to our 
conscious experience.”34 But where is the evidence for the sufficiency of 
appearances? The terms upon which we are allowed access to this realm of 
appearances as such is exactly what is presupposed: First-person 
phenomenology. And how could we deny that we always begin from the first-
person perspective?  
Following Metzinger, the reductive naturalist can argue that:  
 
i. Consciousness, the phenomenal self, and the first-person 
perspective are representational phenomena. 
ii. The first-person approach was historically but is not nomologically 
fundamental. 
iii. We naively operate from a first-person perspective. 
                                                 
32 On the use of the phrase ‘what it is like,’ cf. William Lycan, Consciousness and 
Experience (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996), 77. 
33 The epistemic consequences of this move are briefly dealt with below. 
34 Goff, op cit. 
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iv. A conscious system seems to be a subject of experience when 
it generates experiences that include the experiences of being a subject in 
the world. 
C. Persons, selves, and subjects of I*-thoughts are unjustified 
appearances. 
 
Take Chalmers’ statement: ‘Experience is the most central and 
manifest aspect of our mental lives, and indeed is perhaps the key explanandum 
in the science of the mind. Because of this status as an explanandum, experience 
cannot be discarded like the vital spirit when a new theory comes along.’35 As 
we have shown, this argument contains a transcendental component in the 
form of AqA. By taking experience as fundamental, there is a sense in which 
the anti-reductionist remains unable to give an account of why there is 
experience in the first place.36 The reductive naturalist on the other hand hopes 
to explain why consciousness and first person experience is experienced as a 
brute fact, denying the principle of AqA and providing an explanation for 
those causes and reasons of appearances that do not appear within 
‘appearings.’ That is, the reductive naturalist can grant Chalmers’ distinction 
between the phenomenal and psychological aspects of mind – ‘thinking that q’ 
is not the same as ‘sensing q’ – without conceding the claim that sensing is 
direct and unmediated.37 Countering the principle of AqA, Metzinger shows 
that the positing of appearances as such is an impoverishment of explanation, 
since there is a sub-linguistic reality that is inaccessible to first person 
description: the reality of consciousness is for the most part independent of the 
subject of consciousness.38  
 
A Weaker Form of Transcendentalism 
 
There is a relevant though weaker argument that we have not yet dealt 
with, which suggests that even the reductive naturalist is a weak 
transcendentalist regarding appearances.  
The weak transcendentalist suggests: 
 
                                                 
35 Chalmers, “Facing up to the Problem of Consciousness,” 206. 
36 Cf. Ibid., 210. 
37 This is in accord with Wilfrid Sellars’ claim: “The fact that something looks red to 
me can itself be experienced. But it is not itself an experiencing.” Wilfrid Sellars, “Empiricism 
and the Philosophy of Mind,” in Wilhelm deVries and Timothy Triplett eds., Knowledge, Mind, and 
the Given: Reading Wilfred Sellars’s ‘Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind’ (Cambridge: Hackett, 2000), 
V. 
38 Of course, the attempt to distinguish between ‘thinking that q’ and ‘sensing q’ is a 
difficult issue in itself, and a subject that requires further elucidation, though Metzinger’s account 
in Thomas Metzinger, Being No-One makes a serious attempt at disentangling the associated 
problems. Moreover, such a distinction could be adequately parsed, it would still be incumbent 
upon the argument against reductivism to produce a mechanism by which ‘sensing q’ ought to be 
taken to be unmediated. Thanks to an anonymous review for raising this point. 
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i. Reductive naturalism does not eliminate conscious 
appearances. 
ii. Furthermore, reductive naturalism necessitates the existence 
of those appearances as a target phenomenon of explanation 
and reduction. 
    C. Conscious appearances are a transcendental condition for the 
 possibility of reductive naturalism. 
 
This is admittedly a very thin version of transcendentalism that only 
advocates that conscious appearances are necessary in order to formulate an 
account thereof.39 Nevertheless, if we look more carefully at this assertion, it 
should help to clarify more specifically the terms upon which reductive 
naturalism overcomes the principle of AqA. First, let us state upfront that this 
argument does nothing to undermine what we have said above, since the anti-
reductionist and phenomenologist whose claims we outlined clearly add more 
properties to this weaker form of transcendentalism, primarily in the form of 
first-person phenomenology. Nevertheless, in the spirit of attempting to 
answer such a call to arms, it is incumbent upon the reductive naturalist not to 
simply obviate this issue by eliminating it. Should the reductive naturalist then 
accept weak transcendentalism, or can she show why this strategy is also 
question begging?   
The problem of weak transcendentalism is pithily described by F. H. 
Bradley’s claim:  
 
[F]or nothing is actually removed from existence by being 
labeled ‘appearance.’ What appears is there, and must be 
dealt with; but materialism has no rational way of dealing 
with appearance.40  
 
At first glance, the weak transcendentalist is surely correct, and since 
Metzinger argues that conscious appearances should not be granted ontological 
status, he is guilty of not answering consciousness on its own terms.41 
Nevertheless, we ought to ask exactly what appearances do for weak 
transcendentalism. As noted above, Chalmers allows two options when it 
comes to appearances: either sign up to the principle of AqA, or eliminate 
                                                 
39 This argument is largely due to Dan Hutto, in conversation.  
40 Francis Bradley, Appearance and Reality, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1930), 12. 
Dan Hutto reiterates the point: “Experience cannot simply be explained away. If one admits that 
experiences appear to exist […] then they must be accounted for. We are owed an explanation of 
what accounts for the fact that experiences appear to be as they are. Specifically, we must 
account for their apparent qualitative aspects. Thus […] to say that experiences are mere 
appearances hence not real does not reduce the materialist's explanatory burden.” Dan Hutto, 
“Author's Précís of Beyond Physicalism,” in SWIF Philosophy of Mind Review, (2000), 5. 
41 Dan Hutto makes this point in relation to Dennett. Dan Hutto, “An Ideal Solution 
to the Problems of Consciousness,” in The Journal of Consciousness Studies, 5:3, (1998), 330. 
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phenomenal consciousness altogether.42 The reductive naturalist account 
outlined above provides an alternative to this dichotomy in order to explain 
appearances – the further question is whether or not explanation entails weak 
transcendentalism as Bradley put it. I want to suggest that that this is not the 
case because of two possible unstated inferences in the weak transcendentalist 
position.  
For the weak transcendentalist position to work, its exponent needs to 
infer either a) appearances block revision, or b) conscious appearances are a 
special case. Both adhere to the principle of AqA. Why? b) necessitates a 
limited foundationalism in the phenomenal domain, as Dan Hutto argues:  
 
[I]t is not possible to regard experiences as properties of 
objects. This is primarily due to the fact that modes of 
presentation logically imply a subject to whom they are 
presented.43  
 
This objection has been dealt with above where I suggest it begs the 
question when used to refute reductive naturalism. a) it attempts to block the 
revision of appearances: a claim which, although it seems to be innocuous, 
prompts the question – why would we save appearances rather than revise 
them? The key point here is epistemic: for the reductive naturalist, appearances 
themselves cannot count as knowledge and are open to revision. On our 
account, the reductive naturalist attempts to explain appearances, rather than 
‘explain them away.’  
If we go back to the principle of AqA, the point is simply that 
transcendentalism about appearances asserts that appearances should be taken 
on their own terms; appearing qua appearing as such, rather than as something else. 
Reductive naturalism can accept that conscious ‘appearings’ are only 
appearance, but this is also to say that there are no intrinsic epistemic relations 
of intentional content for conscious states. It looks like the weak 
transcendentalist is attempting to smuggle in a kind of non-inferential 
justification here, which is exactly what Hutto suggests, arguing that 
experiences are “fundamentally grounded in our non-conceptual way of being 
in the world,” so that “our talk of how things appear to us is not open to 
challenge precisely because it serves as non-inferential justification for other 
judgments and beliefs.”44 Experiences become the very ground of justification, 
since they are inextricable from our primary engagement with things.  
Do experiences provide a non-inferential ground of justification? Or, 
on the other hand, can we preserve the idea that experiences might be sub-
                                                 
42 E.g.: “The main intuition at work is that there is something to be explained – some 
phenomenon associated with first person experience […] The only consistent way to get around 
the intuitions is to deny the problem and the phenomenon altogether.” Chalmers The Conscious 
Mind, 110. 
43 Dan Hutto, Beyond Physicalism, (Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 2000), 99. 
44 Dan Hutto, “Turning Hard Problems on Their Heads,” in Phenomenology and the 
Cognitive Sciences, 5:1, (March 2006), 2; 10. 
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conceptual doxastic content, whilst also saying that they are open to revision 
and challenge? There is not the space to outline a full response to this problem: 
nonetheless, we need only to show that the reductive naturalist will provide an 
alternative response in order to highlight the question-begging nature of the 
argument. Metzinger quite clearly asserts the epistemologically unjustified 
nature of experiences, refusing the claim that they provide a ground for 
justification since they are both physically reducible and in principle revisable. 
Epistemologically, there needs to be a ‘justification-maker’ that does not derive 
from other propositional content in order for the weak transcendentalist 
argument to follow, a condition that makes it epistemologically appropriate for 
content justification.45  
The anti-reductionist seems to be capitulating to the ‘myth of the 
epistemic given’ in its most rudimentary form. In Empiricism and the Philosophy of 
Mind, Wilfrid Sellars makes a case against the epistemic given: knowledge of the 
given that can be said to be autonomous or independent of other matters of 
fact.46 Sellars is concerned with the possibility of accounting for the existence 
of experiences without taking them on their own terms: his account of the 
myth of the epistemic given is not an attempt to eliminate ‘appearings’ as such, 
rather it is simply an attempt to relieve them of their status as providing an 
epistemological bedrock for justified belief. On Sellars’ account, the given 
cannot be said to provide non-inferential knowledge or epistemic justification, 
since it does not have the necessary means to be an ‘efficacious evidence-
provider.’  
The problem for the epistemic given would not disappear even if we 
were to accept AqA in order to talk about ‘appearings themselves’ without 
reference to the world. This is because, according to deVries and Triplett, the 
doctrine of the given requires only “that for any empirical knowledge that p, 
some epistemically independent knowledge g is epistemically efficacious with 
respect to p.”47 Indeed, the principle of AqA obscures the role the given plays 
since it attempts to allow ‘appearings’ to be treated as independent of other 
cognitive and physical structures. So, even if we accept the distinction between 
                                                 
45 Cf. Jim Pryor, “Is There Non-Inferential Justification?,” in E. Sosa and M. Steup 
eds., Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (London: Blackwell, 2004). 
46 Cf. Sellars, “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,” VIII.32; also James O’Shea, 
Wilfred Sellars (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007), 106ff. 
47 Wilhem de Vries and Timothy Triplett eds., Knowledge, Mind, and the Given: Reading 
Wilfred Sellars’s ‘Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind’ (Cambridge: Hackett, 2000), 104-5. Chalmers 
argues that he is able to circumnavigate the myth of the given, but, whilst his phenomenal 
epistemology certainly deserves greater attention, it is enough to show that his method – 
introduce a new kind of justifying relation ‘constitution’ – looks like it succumb to the myth in 
three ways: a) Chalmers reasoning for the existence of the ‘constitution’ relation is circular – he 
argues that we should accept it because of the role that it plays in our epistemic activity; b) 
‘constitution’ is structured in much the same way as acquaintance – Sellars’ primary target in 
EPM; c) its role is defined in terms of the provision of incorrigible epistemic efficacy: ‘It is the 
role an experience plays in constituting a direct phenomenal belief that makes that belief 
incorrigible, and indeed incorrigible in virtue of its phenomenological structure, and so justified.’ 
David Chalmers, “Mind and Modality,” in Lectures given at Princeton University (October 12-16 
1998). 
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the psychological and the phenomenal for conscious ‘appearings,’ there is a 
further question to ask: how do we get from this ‘appearing’ to knowledge 
regarding that ‘appearing.’48 Put another way: what else would need to be in 
place before such ‘appearings’ could serve to justify knowledge? Sellars’ point 
can be made very simply: an experience or ‘appearing’ does not justify some 
belief or other by merely ‘appearing,’ and so the case for an epistemological 
AqA should not be granted.  
The weak transcendentalist position relies upon a ‘justification-maker’ 
that is independent from other propositional content. That is to say, 
‘appearings’ are supposed to be in some way epistemically independent of and 
prior to further epistemic activity. There are two horns for this attempt to 
conceive of the role of ‘appearing’ as ‘epistemologically efficacious.’ On the 
first horn, ‘appearing’ is supposed to be non-propositional, in which case it will 
be epistemologically inefficacious since it is not an epistemologically 
appropriate condition for content justification – it cannot provide an 
independent reason or premise to conform or disconfirm beliefs. On the 
second horn, ‘appearing’ might be conceived propositionally, in which case it 
will not turn out to be epistemologically independent in the way the weak 
transcendentalist desires, and it is therefore revisable in the same way as other 
empirical knowledge.49 On both horns, the epistemic version of AqA attempts 
to provide conscious ‘appearings’ with the capacity to justify cognitive states 
without needing justification. Laurence BonJour summates the problem with 
this approach:  
 
[I]t is clear on reflection that it is one and the same 
feature of a cognitive state, namely, its assertive or at least 
representational content, which both enables it to confer 
justification on other states and also creates the need for 
it to be itself justified – thus making it impossible in 
principle to separate these two aspects.50 
 
Nevertheless, the weak transcendentalist might argue that in denying 
her position, the reductive naturalist inevitably ‘muddies the waters’ of the 
explanandum with various explanans by importing description into the target 
phenomenon. Josh Weisberg makes this point against Metzinger; “[I]f a theory 
cannot explain why the explanandum appears as it does to common sense - that 
                                                 
48 Ruth Millikan also makes this point, cf. Ruth Millikan, “How We Make Our Ideas 
Clear: Epistemology for Empirical Concepts,” in On Clear and Confused Ideas (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), 95-108. Gallagher and Zahavi make this mistake in relation 
to philosophical phenomenology, suggesting that phenomenology does not succumb to the myth 
since it phenomenology is concerned with experiences rather than the relation of experiences to 
the world, cf. Shaun Gallagher & Dan Zahavi, The Phenomenological Mind: An Introduction to 
Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science, 24.  
49 Cf. O’Shea, op cit., 111-112; p. 209n10; deVries and Tripplett eds., Knowledge, Mind, 
and the Given: Reading Wilfred Sellars’s ‘Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,’ 105-6. 
50 Laurence BonJour, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1985), 78. 
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is if it cannot ‘save the common-sense appearances’ – we do not count it as a 
successful theory.”51 However, the reductive naturalist as she has been defined here 
expects that the very practice of scientific and philosophical progress will 
enrich and revise the explanandum itself: conscious appearance itself will alter as 
theory proceeds. Moreover, claims to the opposite – that “common-sense 
appearances” are somehow pristine phenomena that are simply given – are 
open to the charge of adopting a form of idealism toward consciousness. 
Consequently, reductive naturalism does not fall foul of Bradley’s 
censure, removing something from existence by labeling it as appearance, since 
the explanation of the origin of those ‘common-sense appearances’ and 
corresponding theoretical intuitions may well completely revise and destroy 
them.52 The weak transcendentalist relies upon an austere version of the 
appearance / reality distinction which the reductive naturalist can jettison. 
Hutto’s argument, which claims that ‘to say that experiences are mere 
appearances hence not real does not reduce the materialist's explanatory 
burden,’ presumes that reductive naturalism will attempt to axiomatically 
eliminate rather than explain and revise appearances. On the other hand, the 
reductive naturalist can agree with Sellars that:  
 
[E]mpirical knowledge, like its sophisticated extension, 
science, is rational, not because it has a foundation but 
because it is a self-correcting enterprise which can put any 
claim in jeopardy, though not all at once.53 
 
From this we may conclude that the weak transcendentalist argument 
is also predicated upon AqA, and hence question begging, since the 
appearances it would save could not provide a neutral ground for the 
explanandum. Moreover, weak transcendentalism requires an epistemic 
argument for the unjustified inference to either the irrevisability or the special 
status of conscious appearances. That is to say, only if the explanandum is 
supposed to be transcendentally autonomous from the explanans does weak 
transcendentalism follow. Outlining this third response clears up some of the 
issues regarding the principle of AqA, with the implication that the anti-
reductionist may well be forced to capitulate to some form of the given.  
 
 
 
                                                 
51 Josh Weisberg, “Consciousness Constrained: A Commentary on Being No One,” in 
Psyche, 11:5, (2005), 6. 
52 Metzinger makes this point; Thomas Metzinger, “Reply to Weisberg,” in Psyche, 12:4, 
(2006), 3. This is consistent with the account of reduction proposed by Churchland; “Reduction 
is not a strict logical deduction of the terms of one theory to those of another, but rather that the 
‘image of the higher order theory,’ or specifically, its explanatory and predictive resources, will be 
preserved in lower level theory.” Paul Churchland, Matter and Consciousness, 2nd Edition 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1989), 49. This is in distinction to the deductive-nomological 
approach, e.g. Earnest Nagel, The Structure of Science (Cambridge: Hackett, 1961), 336-397.  
53 Sellars, “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,” VIII. 
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Conclusion 
 
I hope to have shown that attempts to refute reductive naturalism by 
invoking AqA surreptiously ascribe a transcendental status to conscious 
appearances, and that this strategy is question begging since it imputes to the 
reductive naturalist concepts which are encumbered with the very assumptions 
which she would deny and revise. There may well be other reasons why we 
would want to hold a non-reductive or phenomenological position, but 
whatever those reasons might be, they should not be set out on the basis of 
such claims. As Rinofner-Kreidl and Lynne Rudder Baker have pointed out, 
Metzinger’s work has serious consequences for our semantic and epistemic 
understanding of reality. In this regard, Dan Zahavi suggests: “Why not rather 
insist that the self is real if it has experiential reality and that the validity of our 
account of the self is to be measured by its ability to be faithful to 
experience?.”54 However, this would effectively go full circle, arguing that the 
contents of our ontology should be determined by that which was presupposed 
in the first place: appearing qua appearing. Rudder-Baker makes this allegiance 
clear: “My experience of being a conscious subject is evidence that I am a 
subject, and this evidence overwhelms any possible evidence that I may have 
for any scientific theory to the contrary.”55 My aim in this paper has been to 
show how anti-reductive philosophers at least implicitly rely upon a 
transcendental assumption that precludes explanation by widening the gap 
between conceptual speculation and empirical study. Nevertheless, I would 
suggest that, instead of erecting transcendental schemas that seem designed to 
resist explanatory integration, both the explananda and the explanans of 
conscious experience ought to be left open to revision.56  
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